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I. INTRODUcTION
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 19971 ("ASFA" or the "Act")
purports to change the current law affecting children in our
country's abuse and neglect systems by focusing on the "safety and
' J.D. Candidate, Washington College of Law, at American University, 2000; BA, Drew
University, 1996. I would like to thankJenny Miller for her insights and guidance and the staff
of Ameican UniversityJournal of Gnder, Social Policy & the Law for their assistance in preparing
this piece for publication.
1. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter "ASFA" or "the Act"].
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health of the child"2 rather than on the rights of biological parents,
and by keeping children from "lingering in foster care for years. "s
The Act employs several tactics to accomplish these goals. First, the
Act shortens the permanency planning timeline that states must
follow with regard to children in the foster care system.4 Second, the
Act encourages adoption by removing the "geographic barriers"'
associated with adoption.6  Finally, the Act provides financial
incentives for states that increase their rates of adoption.
2. 143 CONG. REc. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Chafee); see ASFA § 101 (asserting that "the child's health and safety shall be the paramount
concern").
3. 143 CONG. REC. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Chafee).
4. SeeASFA § 103 (a) (mandating that a state join or initiate termination of parental rights
proceedings for all children who have been in foster care for "15 of the most recent 22
months"); see also 143 CONG. REC. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Chafee) ("States will be required to make a permanent plan for these children after a year,
and if a child has been in foster care for more than 15 months.., the State will be required to
take the first steps toward terminating parental rights and finding an adoptive home.").
5. 143 CONG. REc. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Chafee).
6. See ASFA § 202, Pub. L. No. 105-89, Ill Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (addressing the issue of adoption across state and county jurisdictions).
Section 202(a) mandates that "the State shall develop plans for the effective use of cross-
jurisdictional resources to facilitate timely adoptive or permanent placements for waiting
children." Id. § 202(a). Section 202(b) provides:
[A] State shall not be eligible for any payment under this section if the Secretary finds
that, after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the State has.., denied or
delayed the placement of a child for adoption when an approved family is available
outside of the jurisdiction with responsibility for handling the case of the child; or...
failed to grant an opportunity for a fair hearing.., to an individual whose allegation
of a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection is denied by the State or not acted
upon by the State with reasonable promptness.
Id § 202(b).
7. See ASFA § 201 (discussing financial benefits for states to increase adoption rates).
Section 201 provides:
[T]he Secretary shall make a grant to each State that is an incentive-eligible State for a
fiscal year in an amount equal to the adoption incentive payment payable to the State
under this section for the fiscal year, which shall be payable in the immediately
succeeding fiscal year.... A State is an incentive-eligible State for a fiscal year if...
the State has a plan approved under this part for the fiscal year... the number of
foster child adoptions in the State during the fiscal year exceeds the base number of
foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year.... [T]he adoption incentive
payment payable to a State for a fiscal year under this section shall be equal to the sum
of... $4000, multiplied by the amount (if any) by which the number of foster
children adoptions in the State during the fiscal year exceeds the base number of
foster child adoptions for the State for the fiscal year; and ... $2000, multiplied by the
amount (if any) by which the number of special needs adoptions in the State during
the fiscal year exceeds the base number of special needs adoptions for the State for
the fiscal year.
Id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen.Chafee) ("There is money here for States that increase the rate of adoption in their
States.").
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The Act's drafters considered timely termination of parental rights
essential to increase adoption rates and to prevent children from
languishing in the foster care system.8 To accomplish these goals,
ASFA mandates that a state begin termination of parental rights
("TPR") proceedings for children who have been in foster care for at
least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.9 Also, ASFA
enumerates situations in which, absent a compelling reason, a state
must join or initiate immediate TPR proceedings for children
entering foster care."' These situations include those where a parent
has committed murder of another child of the parent, committed
voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or
abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder
or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that
has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of
the parent."
The drafters intended these criteria to expedite a child's move
from foster care to permanent placement if his biological parents
have proved to be unfit, either through lack of improvement for
fifteen months or through behavior that poses an inherent and
irreparable threat to the child's safety. 2
Upon initial inspection, these guidelines for mandatory initiation
of TPR proceedings seem reasonable and in the best interests of the
child 3  For example, the guidelines complement the presumption
8. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.&AN. 2739, 2739
(explaining that ASFA intends to allow states to "move expeditiously to terminate parental
rights and make a child available for adoption"); 143 CONG. REC. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed.
Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("Terminating parental rights is the critical first step
in moving children into permanent placements...."); see also 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06,
H2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw) (stating that, in some circumstances,
states can forego reunification attempts with biological parents and begin immediate
termination of parental rights in order to speed adoption).
9. ASFA § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. During debate, Rep. Shaw asserted that:
If families will not or cannot change within a reasonable period of time, we must, in
the interest of the children, be willing to terminate parental rights and move
expeditiously toward adoption .... In the case of parents who have murdered another
child or lost custody of other children, States are required to dispense with the services
for the family and to move quickly to terminate parental rights and get the child
adopted.
143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2015-16 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
13. See 143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Packard) (asserting that it is simply wrong for states to return children to biological parents who
have abandoned them or badly abused them); 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2018 (daily ed. Apr.
30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roemer) (reporting that previous child welfare laws have often
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that people generally advocate removing a child from a natural
parent who threatens the child's safety.14  However, when viewed
more closely, the criteria of ASFA section 103 do not necessarily serve
the best interests of the child, the family, or society at large.'5
This Comment focuses on one way that ASFA section 103 may fall
short of working toward the best interests of the child and the child's
family-specifically, the statute's failure to address situations where
domestic violence exists in a family unit.'6  The statutory language
mandates that a state terminate a woman's parental rights for aiding
or abetting the murder or voluntary manslaughter of a child, or for
committing a felony assault against a child. 17 Guided by ASFA, a state
could terminate an abused mother's parental rights because she did
not intervene when her batterer killed or abused her child. A
battered woman may not have intervened because she feared
angering her abuser and causing the child more harm, or because
she was physically restrained from taking action.1 Thus, the statutory
resulted in children being returned to abusive parents only to be badly harmed or killed soon
thereafter).
14. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 894 (1984)
(stating that all jurisdictions will terminate parental rights if the parent is proven unfit or has
abandoned the child).
15. See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of ASFA).
16. See ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (listing parental behaviors that determine that a state must initiate TPR
proceedings). Section 103(a) (3) (ii) allows a state to forego TPR proceedings if "a State agency
has documented in the case plan (which shall be available for court review) a compelling
reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the
child." Id. ASFA does not define "compelling reason" or suggest factors, such as domestic
violence, that may provide a compelling reason to forego immediate TPR. Id.
17. See ASFA § 103 (listing aiding and abetting murder or voluntary manslaughter and
committing a felony assault as reasons to initiate immediate TPR proceedings).
18. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mother: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered
Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 229, 242-49 (1996) [hereinafter Enos,
Prosecuting Battered Mothers] (describing incidents of such situations). Enos recounts situations
where women were physically unable to intervene or were afraid of doing so. Id. at 240-60.
One woman testified that she believed if she tried to escape or stop her abuser from raping her
daughter, he would follow through with his threat to kill both her and her daughter. Id. at 242.
The abuser had previously followed through with threats to harm them. Id. Another woman
did not call the police while her husband killed her son because he had threatened to kill her
as well. Id. at 255. A pregnant woman did not intervene while her husband fatally beat her
daughter because he had beaten her in the past and threatened to beat her while she was
pregnant. Id. at 249. See also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood Conflicting Definitions
fiom Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CoRNE.Lt L. REV. 688, 747-55 (1998)
(explaining that a mother did not interfere when her husband beat her daughter because "she
knew, from repeated past experience with this cycle of violence, that her intervention would
further enrage her husband, and thus place her daughters and herself at greater risk of physical
injury." Another woman failed to seek immediate medical attention for her daughter after her
abuser repeatedly burned the child with a hot spatula and cigarettes because he bolted the door
and held a knife to the woman's throat.); Cf V. Pualani Enos, Counter-Response to Kathryn L.
Quaintance, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 315 (1998) (maintaining her position regarding her critical
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language not only encourages states to assign legal liability to a
battered woman for failure to protect her child, but it also allows
states to terminate her parental rights on these grounds. 19
ASFA does not create the problem of blaming and punishing
women for their abusers' actions. Rather, case law and prior statutes
create a preexisting framework that controls when applying ASFA.
Still, as ASFA attempts to reform the abuse and neglect system, parts
of the Act, specifically section 103, may actually exacerbate existing
problems in the abuse and neglect system by requiring that domestic
relations law be separated from abuse and neglect law. 21 This
analysis of Quaintance's prosecution of a battered woman for failure to protect her child); But
see Kathryn L. Quaintance, Response to V. Pualani Enos' "Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws'
Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, "Published in Volume 19 of the Harvard Women's
Law Journa4 21 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 309 (1998) (defending her actions as prosecutor in
Minnesota v. Loch (unreported 1992 decision), which Enos analyzed).
19. Jane C. Murphy defines the "failure to protect" doctrine in the context of child abuse:
Under... "failure-to-protect" laws, the caretaking parent's failure to perform the legal
duty of protecting a child against abuse or neglect takes the place of the criminal act.
Some failure-to-protect statutes require either knowledge of danger to the child or
intent to endanger the child. Most statutes, however, impose "strict liability" by
imposing criminal liability on caretakers who "permit" or "create" a substantial risk of
injury or neglect without requiring an affirmative act that violates the duty of care or
an intent to harm.
Murphy, supra note 18, at 719-20.
20. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 229 ("Although the 'failure to
protect' doctrine is a valuable tool for the effective protection of children, the overly broad
application of the doctrine by the courts results in grave inequities for battered mothers and
substantial harm for their children."). Michelle S. Jacobs explores the development of the
failure to protect doctrine in abuse and neglect law in Requiring Battered Women to Die: Murder
Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRAIINOLOGY 579 (1998).
Jacobs asserts that a parent's duty to protect his child is "one of the earliest consistently
recognized special relationships." ld. at 625. Legislators' focus on reducing child abuse in the
early 1970's, and their decision to prosecute parents for unintentionally injuring a child,
prompted states to begin using the failure to protect doctrine to prosecute parents. Id. at 609.
State v. Williquette, 370 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), established criminal liability for non-
abusing parents on failure to protect grounds. In that case, the trial court dismissed the state's
prosecution of a mother for failure to protect her children from their father's abuse. Il. at 282.
The appeals court reversed, finding that if the mother knew that her husband abused the
children and did not interfere, the state could prosecute her for aiding and abetting the abuse
under the failure to protect doctrine. Id. at 285. Following this case, Wisconsin codified the
failure to protect doctrine within its child protective statute. Jacobs, supra, at 618. Other states
followed, and now most jurisdictions include failure to protect within their child protective
statutes. Jacobs, supra, at 612.
21. See ASFA § 103 (requiring States to file a petition to terminate parental rights if the
parent has committed felony assault upon one of her children). ASFA § 103 mandates that
[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility
of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent
jurisdiction has determined the child to be an abandoned infant... or has
made a determination that the parent has committed voluntary
manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted,
conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary
manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious
bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file
a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents... and,
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separation discourages states from examining the effect of domestic
violence on a battered woman's behavior regarding her abused
child.22 By failing to address child abuse within the context of family
violence, ASFA section 103 may prevent states from working toward
the best interests of the child.23
This Comment addresses the potential problems of ASFA section
103's mandatory termination of parental rights in view of the existing
systemic separation of domestic violence from abuse and neglect law.
Part II provides a brief historical background of ASFA, including why
legislators felt a need to reform abuse and neglect law and how they
have attempted to accomplish these goals through ASFA. Part III
explains that many jurisdictions currently separate domestic violence
and abuse and neglect cases into different court systems, despite
research and statistics that reveal an overwhelming connection
between the two issues. Part IV discusses why courts should consider
domestic violence during termination of parental rights proceedings.
Furthermore, Part IV suggests that domestic violence affects a
woman's actions and apparent inactions, and when courts fail to
consider this fact, they may erroneously terminate a battered
mother's parental rights. Part V analyzes how ASFA not only fails to
consider domestic violence, but encourages jurisdictions not to
consider domestic violence. ASFA accomplishes this through the
language of section 103 and by shifting onto the state the burden to
present a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights of a
victim of domestic violence. Finally, Part VI proposes solutions to the
problem, such as modifying the statutory language to create
concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for
an adoption, unless (i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for
by a relative; (ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan... a
compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in
the best interests of the child; or (iii) the State has not provided to the family
of the child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such
services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the
child's home, if reasonable efforts of the type described in section
471 (a) (15) (B) (ii) are required to be made with respect to the child.
Id.
22. SeeJacobs, supra note 20, at 611 ("[A] woman involved in a battering relationship
cannot always exercise choices we assume would be 'normal' and rational.").
23. See Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family
Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3, 7 (1998) ("[A] court that treats a range of family problems 'as a series of
single separate controversies may often not do justice to the whole or to the several parts. The
several parts are likely to be distorted in considering them apart from the whole.'") (quoting
Roscoe Pound, ThePlace of the Family Court in theJudicial System, 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE
ASS'NJ. 161, 164 (1959)); Barbara A. Babb, Where We Stand: An Analysis of America's Family Law
Adjudicatory Systems and the Mandate to Fstablish Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 31, 32 (1998)
(noting that, because of courts' failures to meet families' needs, the American Bar Association
has recommended that all states create unified family courts to address all issues relating to the
family).
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awareness of domestic violence and child abuse in the context of
family violence.
II. THE HIISTORY OFASFA
ASFA grew out of federal legislators' belief that, under the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,24 states focused
too much on parental rights and not enough on the best interests of
the child25 The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
mandated that when a child entered the foster care system, the state
should make reuniting the child with his biological parents its
primary objective.26 The drafters presumed that a child would be best
24. Pub. L. No. 96-272,94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740
(asserting that sometimes courts protect the rights of the parents to the detriment of the child);
143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2018 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Burton) ("In the
last decade child welfare has grown into an enormous bureaucratic system that is biased toward
preserving the family at any cost."). But see Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in
Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Povety and the Role of the Lanyers Who Represent Then, 66
FORDHAm L. REv. 2285, 2288 (1998) (asserting that ASFA resulted from societal outrage over
news reports on extreme acts of child abuse by biological parents whose children are in the
abuse and neglect system); Barbara Peterson, New Adoption Law Means "Fundamental Shift" in
Rights, ST. BAR NEvs, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 14 (stating that ASFA resulted from highly publicized
cases where foster children were returned to their abusive natural parents and were seriously
harmed or killed soon thereafter). The legislative history of ASFA supports Bailie's and
Peterson's assertions. During debate, several Representatives and Senators included in their
statements anecdotes of extreme child abuse and appealed to their colleagues' sensibility,
rather than their sense, in asking them to pass ASFA. For example, Rep. Hoyer encouraged his
fellow members of Congress to support ASFA by painting the following portrait:
You may remember a child named Dooney Waters. The Washington Post ran a series of
stories on him in 1989. Dooney was raised in a crack house .... Dooney spent days at
a time hiding behind his bed .... Dooney was burned by boiling water and his hand
was singed by a can used to heat crack cocaine .... The bill requires expedited
terminat[ion] of parental rights in chronic cases of abuse and neglect, such as
Dooney's.
143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
In the Senate, Sen. Chafee used a similar tactic to inspire support of ASFA-
The tragic story of young Sabrina Green's short life is harrowing, and it is all too
reminiscent of the cases we read and hear about, unfortunately, every single day. Each
time I read about a case like Sabrina Green's, I feel outrage and frustration .... Now,
Mr. President, we cannot bring Sabrina Green back to life... but we can take action
to prevent such deaths in the future, and that is what we're doing today.
143 CONG. REC. S12526-02, S12526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee). See
also 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
("Every one of us in this body can turn to and refer to headlines in their papers, the terrible,
heartbreaking case with little Emily in Michigan, other cases across these United States,
headlines telling us the very worst can happen."); 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2018-19 (daily
ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roemer) (citing Chicago Tribune articles documenting
children reunited with their biological parents who were then badly abused or killed soon
thereafter); 143 CoNG. REC. H2012-06, H2028 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Tiahrt) ("I am reminded of a young girl named Halie, who was 2 years old, who refused to eat
her dinner and her parents tied her to an electric heater; and once she got caught into that
system... she did not get out of foster care until she was 18 years old .... ").
26. See 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
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served by reuniting her with her natural parents if at all possible,
rather than seeking adoption.27 Still, they realized that in some
situations, a child's best interests diverged from the goal of keeping
the family intact.28 For this reason, the drafters did not mandate that
a state indefinitely attempt to reunite a parent and child, but that it
make "reasonable efforts" to reunite a child with her natural
parents.2 Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act,
agencies such as Child Protective Services ("CPS") and Children and
Youth Services ("CYS") attempted to protect abused and neglected
children while remaining sensitive to parents' fundamental rights."0
According to ASFA's drafters, agencies' and states'
misinterpretation of the "reasonable efforts" requirement
contributed to the rising number of children in foster care and the
increased amount of time children spent in foster care." During
floor debate on ASFA, Representative Harman stated that, "in the
absence of clear laws or regulations defining reasonable efforts, there
has been considerable confusion about when to bypass or
discontinue such efforts .... [T]he reasonable efforts provision has
sometimes served to keep kids in foster homes, instead of in
permanent adoptive homes, longer than necessary." 2 Some analysts
asserted that CPS and similar agencies allowed children to languish
Pomeroy) ("The 1980 Child Welfare Act clearly made the priority reunification of families.").
27. See Bailie, supra note 25, at 2289 (asserting that the philosophy behind the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act assumes that keeping or reuniting a child with her biological
parents is preferable to foster placement or adoption).
28. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental
Rights of Children in Foster Care-An EmpiicalAnalysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 123 (1995)
(expressing that the legislators of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act hoped that
states would terminate parental rights after the eighteenth month of foster care, if the
biological parent was still not a suitable caretaker).
29. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 101(5), 94
Stat. 500.
30. See Bailie, supra note 25, at 2290 (explaining that the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act mandated that a state remove a child from her parents' home if her home
environment is unsafe, and make efforts to reunify the family following removal); The
Honorable Patrick R. Tamilia, A Response to Elimination of the Reasonable Efforts Required Prior to
Termination of Parental Rights Status, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 211, 212 (1992) (outlining the history of
the nation's abuse and neglect system). See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)
(establishing clear and convincing as the evidentiary standard in termination of parental rights
proceedings).
31. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740 ("One
barrier [to adoption] is the 'reasonable efforts' criterion in the Federal statute .... Federal
statutes, the social work profession, and the courts sometimes err on the side of protecting the
rights of parents."); Barbara Kessler, Congress, Texas Lawmakers Work to ExpediteAdoptions, DALLAS
MORMNNG NEws, Feb. 22, 1998, at 32A (asserting that adoptions have been delayed because
"courts and caseworkers labored fruitlessly to rehabilitate a drug-addicted parent or
dysfunctional couple").
32. 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2022 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Harman).
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in the foster care system while the agencies gave parents years to
correct inappropriate and unsafe behavior, even when the parents
made little effort to improve themselves.3 As this continued, the
number of children in foster care increased, but adoptions did not
increase at the same rate, in part because some parental rights were
not terminated in a timely fashion.'
By the mid 1990s, the nation's foster care system had grown so
large that legislators felt it must be reformed to lessen the caseload."
ASFA's drafters wanted to reduce the number of children in foster
care by increasing the rate of adoptions."6 They also wanted to
accelerate the adoption process to ensure that children did not spend
years in foster care.37
To accomplish these goals, ASFA mandates that states focus on the
best interests of the child rather than parental rights. For example,
section 101 addresses when a state should make "reasonable efforts"
3 9
33. See Tamilia, supra note 30, at 223 (noting the failure of social and legal services to
negotiate effectively the reasonable efforts requirement); 143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2023
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Packard) (outlining the failures of the current
abuse and neglect system, including "returning children to the natural parents, despite
circumstances such as abandonment and chronic physical or sexual abuse ... ."); see also 143
CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy) (criticizing
efforts to aid parents "who just have not been able to grow up and deal responsibly with their
parental responsibilities").
34. See 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Packard) (noting that less than 10% of children in foster care are adopted each year and
blaming "Washington bureaucracy").
35. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 8 (1997) (noting that the nation's foster care system
houses about 500,000 children and has grown tremendously since the mid 1980s); 143 CONG.
REC. H2012-06, H2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Camp) ("[Slince 1982 the
number of children in foster care has increased by 89%."); see also Cristina Chi-Young Chou,
Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care: Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REv. 683, 684 (1993)
(blaming weakening family structure, alcoholism, homelessness, and worsening social
conditions as reasons for the increase of children in foster care).
36. See Peterson, supra note 25, at 14 (stating that ASFA "aims to move children from foster
care into permanent homes by speeding up the adoption process"). See generally 143 CONG.
REC. H2012-06, H2028 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Burton) (explaining why
long-term foster care is detrimental to children). According to the American Civil Liberties
Union, of the 15,000 foster care children who reach the age of majority in a given year, "40%
become dependent on [Aid to Families with Dependent Children], 46% [drop] out of school,
51% were unemployed, and 60% of the women had out-of-wedlock births within 2 years from
graduating from foster care" and the Bureau ofJustice reports that "former foster children are
nearly 30 times more likely to be incarcerated" than those who never entered the foster care
system." 1d.
37. See Peterson, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the motivation behind ASFA); see also 143
CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2014 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hall) (stating that
ASFA aims to hasten adoption of children in foster care).
38. See Peterson, supra note 25, at 14 (explaining that ASFA represents a shift in focus).
39. ASFA § 101(B) explains that a state should make "reasonable efforts ... to preserve
and reunify families... prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate
the need for removing the child from the child's home" and "to make it possible for a child to
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to keep a child with his natural parents, stressing that "the child's
health and safety shall be the paramount concern."" Section 103
enumerates situations in which a state must initiate or join immediate
TPR proceedings because the natural parent presents a threat to the
child's safety and, presumably, no chance of improvement exists."
Section 103 also mandates that a state work simultaneously to
determine whether there is a compelling reason to reunify a child
with her parents and to find an adoptive home for her.42 This dual
approach aims to decrease the amount of time a child stays in foster
care.43  Finally, section 106 requires criminal record checks for
prospective adoptive parents.4 ASFA thus represents a "fundamental
safely return to the child's home." ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(B), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). ASFA does not specifically define "reasonable
efforts," but section 103(a) refers to reasonable efforts as "such services as the State deems
necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home." ASFA § 103(a)(iii). This
language gives states wide discretion in deciding what constitutes reasonable efforts. Id.
40. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
41. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a) (3) (E), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). This section provides:
in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State
for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction has
determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has
made a determination that the parent has committed murder of another child of the
parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or
abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a
voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious
bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file a
petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents (or, if such a petition
has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and,
concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for
adoption ....
Id. See also Gail Vida Hamburg, An Act of Compassion May Require Some Decisive Actions to Make it
Work; Cm. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1998, at 1 (observing that psychologists assert that severe child abuse
irreparably breaks the parent-child bond, and the child in this situation is best served by the
State's terminating his abusive parent's parental rights).
42. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
43. See Roya M. Hough, Juvenile Law: A Year in Review, 63 MO. L. REV. 459, 468 (1998)
(explaining that concurrent planning should lessen the amount of time a child spends in foster
care because the alternative plan often takes a significant amount of time to litigate, which
could leave a child in temporary foster care for an unnecessarily long time if begun after
reuniting with parents fhils).
44. ASFA § 106 mandates:
[U]nless an election provided for in subparagraph (B) is made with respect to the
State, provides procedures for criminal records checks for any prospective foster or
adoptive parent before the foster or adoptive parent may be finally approved for
placement of a child on whose behalf foster care maintenance payments or adoption
assistance payments are to be made under the State plan under this part, including
procedures that... in any case in which a record check reveals a felony conviction for
child abuse or neglect, for spousal abuse, for a crime against children (including child
pornography), or for a crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or
homicide, but not including other physical assault or battery, if a State finds that a
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shift" ' in states' weighing of rights, from parent-focused to child-
focused.46
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the legislation will truly
work in the best interests of the child. ASFA has already received
criticism from professionals in the abuse and neglect system who
assert that the legislation could break up families unjustly.4' A
professor at New York University School of Law criticized the
mandatory initiation of TPR proceedings for children in the system
for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, saying, "[w] e banish
children from their relatives and we pretend to make efforts to
reunify the family and then we pounce on these families and say 'its
too late."' 8 Another child advocate attacked ASFA section 103's
intensive pursuit of termination of parental rights, noting that "only
one-half of one percent of child abuse [cases] are the crimes you
read about, yet our entire system is designed to avoid the one-half of
one percent, and everybody responds as if all these parents are going
to kill their children."4 9 During House debate, Representative Patsy
Mink criticized ASFA as well, stating that section 103, which requires
states to initiate or join immediate TPR proceedings, restricted states
too severely.-" She went on to assert,
[it] is easy enough to state that adoption will be in the best interests
of the child, who will have a better home to live in and a higher
quality material environment than the one from which they came.
court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the felony was committed at any
time, such final approval shall not be granted; and ... in any case in which a record
check reveals a felony conviction for physical assault, battery, or a drug-related offense,
if a State finds that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the felony
was committed within the past 5 years, such final approval shall not be granted ....
ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 106, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
45. Peterson, supra note 25, at 14.
46. Critics assert that ASFA shifts states' focus from family-focused to child-focused. See
Bailie, supra note 25, at 2291-92 (asserting that ASFA diminishes the concept of family
preservation and may place unjust demands on parents who desire reunification with their
children).
47. See Peterson, supra note 25, at 14 (noting that people have attacked ASFA as "anti-
family"); Bailie, supra note 25, at 2292-93 (stating that ASFA represents a backlash against family
preservation and suggesting that, because ASFA focuses on cases of extreme abuse, the more
common cases of neglect due to poverty will be mishandled under the new legislation. This
could result in "poor families who are in the child welfare system because of suspected neglect
[being) ignored.").
48. Peterson, supra note 25, at 14.
49. Hamburg, supra note 41, at 1.
50. See 143 CONG. REc. H2012-35, H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Mink) ("A Congress that has repeatedly argued States rights should not abandon that principle
and enact legislation whose title in section 3 provides: States required to initiate or join
proceedings to terminate parental rights for certain children in foster care... .").
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This however ignores that basic undifferentiated family value of the
love of a parent.51
Representative Mink's statement reveals an essential flaw of ASFA:
in its attempts to focus on the child, it could fail to work toward the
best interests of the family. 2  ASFA, particularly section 103,
encourages states to focus on the child, rather than viewing family
problems concurrently. 3 The question arises as to whether we truly
serve the best interests of the child when we view his situation, which
is part of a deeper family dynamic, as separate from the conditions
from which it grows. 4 ASFA's intense child-focus and inflexible
standard for mandatory termination of parental rights could result in
inadequate responses to a family's needs when a child enters foster
care.
55
This potential failure of ASFA could prove especially problematic
for domestic violence victims. 6 The often unjust termination of these
victims' parental rights has been well-documentedY. Rather than
working to rectify this, ASFA could exacerbate the problem and
51. Id.
52. See Peterson, supra note 25, at 14 (noting that some people within the abuse and
neglect system criticized ASFA as "'anti-family'").
53. See supra notes 37-45, and accompanying text (enumerating how ASFA shifts the focus
of those who work in the abuse and neglect system).
54. See Bailie, supra note 25, at 2287 ("Children... are not independent or isolated
individuals but, rather, are members of families. Therefore, any attempt to help children must
attempt to help and heal the entire family.").
55. See Bailie, supra note 25, at 2293 (proposing that ASFA focuses on the most extreme
cases of abuse and neglect, and may result in the unjust separation of poor families because
poverty often cannot be rectified within 15 months). In an interview by Jean Heliwege, Marian
Wright Edelman, founder of the Children's Defense Fund, asserted that:
[I]t is imperative that services that expedite decisions about reunification or
permanent placement be provided to children and their parents from the first day the
children enter the foster care system .... [U]nless there are additional resources at
all levels to families who suffer from problems related to mental health diseases or
disorders, domestic violence, and substance abuse, children will likely continue to
bounce in and out of foster care and be denied permanent placement.
Interview by Jean Hellwege with Marian Wright Edelman, founder of the Children's Defense
Fund, TRIAL (Aug. 1998), at 20, 24.
56. See infra Part V (discussing how ASFA's mandate that TPR proceedings begin
immediately for aiding and abetting, or the mother's failure to protect the child could result in
the unjust termination of the battered women's parental rights).
57. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 260 ("Too often.., instead of
protecting the mother from her abuser, the courts will terminate the mother's parental
rights."); Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered
Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 290 (1995) (explaining that many states will file TPR proceedings
against both an abusive and non-abusive parent, even though this "makes little sense" for an
abused woman, because she will very likely become a safe and effective parent when protected
from her abuser).
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sacrifice the best interests of the family through statutory insensitivity
to domestic violence victims
s58
III. MANYJURISDICTIONS CURRENTLY SEPARATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, DESPITE A STRONG
STATISTICAL LINK BETWEEN THE TWO.
Many jurisdictions separate issues of abuse and neglect from those
of domestic violence. 9 In fact, only eleven jurisdictions address all
family law matter 6 within one family court, division, or department6
58. See infra Part V (addressing ASFA's statutory mandate that states terminate parental
rights in cases of aiding and abetting murder or voluntary manslaughter or failure to protect
from severe abuse).
59. In her analysis of family law in the United States, Barbara A. Babb enumerates how all
fifty states address family law matters. See Babb, supra note 23, at 38-39 (enumerating the
different methods used by all fifty states and the District of Columbia). To assess the
responsiveness of each state's approach, she focuses on the structure of the court system, the
subject matter jurisdiction states afford their family courts, the methods of case assignment, and
the length of judges' terms. I& Regarding structure of the court system, Babb found that
Delaware, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont have separate family courts.
Id. The District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Washington address family law
matters in their own division of trial courts. Id. Massachusetts addresses family law cases in a
separate department of its trial court. Id. at 39. Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wisconsin have separate family courts in some areas of those states. Id. at 40. California,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Virginia have or
plan to implement "pilot family court projects." I&. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming adjudicate family law cases within their
general civil trial dockets. Id. However, states' determinations of what constitutes family law
varies, and the subject-matter jurisdiction that states afford their family courts or divisions
reflects this. Id. at 42. Thus, even in the few jurisdictions that have separate family courts,
issues of domestic violence might not be addressed because "family law" is determined by the
subject matter jurisdiction the states afford the court. Id States' methods of assigning cases
vary widely, even in the jurisdictions that have separate family courts. Id. at 43. Some assign
cases on a "daily, weekly, monthly, or regularly scheduled basis." Id. at 44. Others assign cases
to judges for the duration of the case. Id. at 45. Still others assign one judge to one family. Id.
However, these jurisdictions do not always afford broad subject matter jurisdiction to their
family court or division, so the same judge will not necessarily hear both domestic violence and
child abuse issues. Id. at 38-46. The lengths ofjudges' terms vary as well, from several months
to life. Id. at 43-46.
60. Babb defines family law as:
a comprehensive approach to family law subject-matter jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction over cases involving divorce, annulment, and property distribution; child
custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, and
termination of parental rights; juvenile causes (juvenile delinquency, child abuse, and
child neglect); domestic violence; criminal nonsupport; name change; guardianship of
minors or disabled persons; and withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
procedures, involuntary admissions, and emergency evaluations.
Babb, supra note 23, at 31 n.1.
61. See Babb, supra note 23, at 38-42 (listing Delaware, D.C., Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Washington as these
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Of these, only one state assigns one judge per family for any family
law issue that brings them before the court. 2 In many jurisdictions,
communication between the various courts and social agencies
dealing with a particular family is poor or non-existent. 3 This causes
"unnecessary delay, duplication and contradictory rulings and
recommendations"6 which "'wastes money and does not serve
children well.' "65 All of the issues adjudicated result from the same
family dynamic, yet different cases and different courts address them.
Because courts view issues of domestic violence and child abuse
separately, a judge will not consider domestic violence during TPR
proceedings.' This becomes problematic considering the strong
statistical link between domestic violence and child abuse; in homes
jurisdictions). Babb explains that states afford varying degrees of subject matter jurisdiction to
their family courts. Id. at 42. For example, New York's family court adjudicates child neglect,
including TPR proceedings, but does not address domestic violence. Id. The District of
Columbia's family court has comprehensive jurisdiction over all matters that fall within the
rubric of family law, including abuse and neglect and domestic violence. Id. Howeverjudges
preside over the various dockets in D.C. Family Court for ninety days to nine months, so the
chance of a family coming before the same judge to address different family law issues is less
likely than if the judge presided over a particular docket for a longer period of time. Id. at 42-
n.68.
62. See Babb, supra note 23, at 44 (noting that only Delaware assigns one judge to one
family). This structure may provide the best way to adjudicate family law cases. Because
Delaware adjudicates family law matters separately from its general civil docket, affords
comprehensive jurisdiction to the family courts, and assigns one judge to one family, the state
increases the possibility that a judge will gain a comprehensive understanding of the family
dynamic and controlling forces within the family such as domestic violence. See id. (noting that
only Delaware assigns one judge per family so that each time a family member appears in court,
they appear before the same judge).
63. See Babb, supra note 23, at 47 (citing ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE
UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 54 (1993)) [hereinafter ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING
GROUP] ("In virtually all cases, in virtually all communities, the myriad courts and social service
agencies do not communicate adequately with each other."); see also Bernardine Dohm, Bad
Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2
(1995) ("In Cook County [in Illinois], two courts--domestic violence and juvenile-are little
more than a mile apart, yet they inhabit different planets.").
64. Babb, supra note 23, at 47 (quoting ABA PRESIDENTIALWORKING GROUP).
65. Babb, supra note 23, at 47 (quoting ABA PRESIDENTIALWORKING GROUP).
66. Bernadine Dohrn explains that:
Where child neglect or abuse is adjudicated, for example, domestic violence against
the mother may not be apparent. At the same time, feminists argue that the
adjudication of child neglect or abuse takes place in a troubling vacuum which rejects
consideration of context: a mother's need to survive and to protect her children, their
economic dependency, or their fear of physical violence.
Dohrn, supra note 63, at 1-2. See also Murphy, supra note 18, at 744 ("A battered mother whose
partner has abused her child may be a defendant in a criminal prosecution for 'failure to
protect.' That same mother may also be a complaining witness herself in a criminal case against
her abuser or a petitioner seeking a civil protection order."); Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers,
supra note 18, at 244 (explaining that a battered woman may be held criminally liable for
parental kidnapping if she tries to escape her home with her children, but risks being held
criminally liable for failure to protect if she stays).
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where domestic violence exists, children are overwhelmingly more
likely to be abused than children who do not live with domestic
violence in their families.67 A father who abuses his wife is three times
more likely to abuse his children than a father who does not.6 Both
parents are more likely to abuse their children if the father abuses
the mother.69 The correlation between child abuse and domestic
abuse suggests that judges should examine potential domestic
violence while adjudicating child abuse cases, including TPR
proceedings, in order to establish a full understanding of the family
dynamic, the parents' behaviors, and the effects on the child.7 0 Still,
even if a woman is permitted to present evidence of domestic
violence, the judge has wide discretion in weighing the evidence.
Despite statistics showing the two are inextricably linked, the
separation of domestic violence from abuse and neglect law persists,
and, as a result, courts terminate mothers' parental rights when
termination may not be in the best interests of the child.72 This
sometimes unjust termination often results from ignorance about
domestic violence, which pervades every aspect of the abuse and
neglect system s The police who initially investigate abuse and
67. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 268 n.27 (estimating that
children who grow up in families where domestic violence is present have a 1500% higher rate
of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse than average); see also Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse
and Domestic Violence Legal Connections and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 372 n.8 (1995)
(noting a National Crime Survey revealing that 91% percent of spousal violence incidents were
committed by men against women); Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 234-35
("Abusers may injure the children of their female victims purposely in order to hurt and
control the abused women or may hurt children because they try to defend their mothers.");
Murphy, supra note 18, at 741 (noting a significant statistical link between domestic abuse and
child abuse).
68. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 741 (discussing the connections between domestic
violence and child abuse).
69. SeeJulie Momjian, Fighting the Domestic Violence Battle, 28 PAC. LJ. 847, 860 n.3 (1997)
(noting that roughly 70% of children who enter battered women's shelters are abused or
neglected); Murphy, supra note 18, at 741 (noting the statistical correlation between domestic
violence and child abuse).
70. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 75, 89 (1993) ("[Rlesearchers found that... children exposed to battering
relationships showed more aggression, exhibited impaired cognitive and motor abilities, and
were delayed in verbal development.").
71. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 244 ("Courts often 'note' or
'acknowledge' the fear of a battered woman but refuse to consider the reasonableness of these
fears when determining the woman's culpability with regard to her duty to protect her
children.").
72. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 231 (explaining that agencies re-
victimize abused children by separating them from their non-violent parent); Momjian, supra
note 69, at 854 (noting that "whenever possible, an abused child needs to remain in the home
with a non-offending parent to maintain the stability and well-being of the child.").
73. See Dohm, supra note 63, at 8 ("Attorneys, judges, and caseworkers still frequently
blame women for their victimization."); cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 14 (Oct. 1991) (observing that judges,
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neglect cases may fail to recognize signs that a mother has been
abused.74 CPS might not correlate the mother's abuse to her alleged
failure to parent appropriately,75 and "some data suggests that there
may be a bias among child protective services workers monitoring
situations of [child] abuse to believe that the abuse is the mother's
fault."76 Lawyers in the system may treat the mother's abuse as a sign
of her inability to parent.77 Finally, courts are often unsympathetic to
an abused mother; even when she provides evidence of domestic
violence, courts may still declare her an unfit parent due to their
fundamental misunderstanding of domestic violence's impact on a
woman's behavior.78 The separation of domestic violence from abuse
attorneys, social workers, and consulted psychologists have a one in four chance of being a
victim or victimizer in domestic violence at some point in their lives. Because of this, "the
atmosphere in the courtroom will not reflect mere ignorance .... Rather, the response to and
evaluation of the case before them will also include the unseen and unspoken ties that bind
these participants to the fabric of their own lives, their parents' lives, and their children's,").
74. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 752 (noting a case in which police arrested a mother for
contributing to child abuse when she called them to her home after her boyfriend severely beat
her daughter. A police officer noticed that the mother had bruises on her face, but made no
inquiry into the matter.); see also Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 240
(analyzing several cases in which abused women were refused aid by the police department).
But see Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why it May Prove the Best First Step in
Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JusT. 2, 52 (1995) (discussing the implementation of mandatory
arrest laws, which have increased the number of arrests in incidents of domestic violence).
75. See Enos, ProsecutingBattered Mothers, supra note 18, at 250 (noting that CPS workers are
generally not trained to work with battered women and discourage them from contacting their
offices). But see Vivian Wakefield, Helping not Hurting. Advocates for Battered Women, Children
Working to Make the Home Safer, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 18, 1997, at BI (discussing a local
project combining the expertise of CPS and battered women's advocates to serve abused
women and children better).
76. Ashe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 87.
77. SeeAshe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 99 ("[D]ecisions concerning prosecutions will tend
to reflect race, class, and gender biases of prosecutors who have tended to be white, middle
class, and male."); Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 248 (examining a child
abuse case in which a prosecutor argued that a battered woman chose to return to her abuser,
thereby exposing her child to danger, when the man physically forced himself into her home);
see also Murphy, supra note 18, at 747-51 (chronicling a case in which a woman's daughters were
removed from her home because she did not interfere when her abuser beat her daughter.
The woman feared that interference would further enrage her abuser. As soon as the husband
was gone, the woman took her children to her mother's house and then to the hospital. The
Department of Social Services removed the girls from the woman soon thereafter. During the
year-long adjudication of the case, neither the child protective services worker, the lawyers for
the children and DSS, nor the judge asked whether the husband had abused the mother as well
as the children.).
78. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 240-49 (discussing unjust
termination of battered mother's parental rights, where no one involved inquired into potential
domestic violence). Enos notes a case in which a court terminated a mother's parental rights:
[w]hile court reports describe the abuser kicking, punching, burning, and dragging
the mother across a parking lot by her hair, the court failed to refer to these incidents
when interpreting and rationalizing the behavior of the mother. The court.., found
that her inability to provide her child with a violence-free environment demonstrated
a "willful failure" to meet the demands of her parental responsibilities.
Id. at 242. Another court recognized that a battered woman will sometimes not act due to her
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and neglect law lies at the center of this problem.
IV. To ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, COURTS SHOULD
CONSIDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER OR
NOT TO ENTER A CHILD INTO FOSTER CARE AND DURING TPR
PROCEEDINGS
Viewed in a vacuum, a battered woman's behavior as a parent in an
abuse and neglect case may seem irresponsible or even reprehensible
enough to terminate her parental rights." However, when an
adjudicator considers the entire family dynamic, which is dictated by
domestic violence, some women's behaviors begin to make more
80
sense.
A woman may fail to protect her child because, based on past
experience with her abuser, she fears her interference will further
enrage him and ultimately cause more harm to the child.8' She may
fail to protect her child because her abuser physically precludes her
from doing so. 2 She may fail to contact police out of a legitimate fear
that doing so will lead CPS or a similar agency to remove the child
from her custody.s She may reasonably fear that the system will
justified fear of her abuser, but still held the mother strictly liable for failure to protect her
children. See id. at 248 (citing the ruling of a NewYork court in In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464,
470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992)). One court disregarded evidence of spousal abuse completely,
holding that the woman had "'freely, knowingly and intentionally [chosen] her situation.'" Id.
at 249. Another court dismissed evidence of spousal abuse entirely as "unimportant" Id See
also Ashe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 99 ("Mothering is taken out of its context... and is judged
by ajudiciary that assumes middle-class, sexist, and racist norms."); Martha Minow, Words and
The Door to The Land of Chang" Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1671
(1990) (noting that some in the legal field believe the court is an inappropriate forum to
address issues of domestic violence).
79. See In reJ.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (noting a "chaotic home life"
and domestic violence as reasons to terminate a mother's parental rights); In re L__E__E. v.
HE, 839 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming termination of mother's parental
rights for boyfriend's abuse of her children); see also State v. Williquette, 370 N.W.2d 282, 285
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that probable cause existed to convict mother of aiding and
abetting for failing to protect her children from their father's abuse).
80. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (explaining battered women's behavior in
situations of child abuse).
81. See Jane E. Brody, Battered Women Should Plan For Their Escape and Aftemath, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 22, 1998, at 3 (explaining that when batterers believe they are losing control of
their family, they will frequently become more violent); Tracy Wilson & Lorenza Munoz, Parents
May Be Tried Separately in Girl's Death, LA. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at BI (discussing the case of
Gabriela Hernandez, who was charged with the beating death of her child. The mother
asserted that when she interfered with her husband's child abuse, he would beat the child
more, then beat her as well.).
82. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 755 (recounting a situation where a batterer bolted the
door and held a knife to the mother's throat to keep her from seeking medical attention for
her abused daughter. When the man finally left the apartment twentyfour hours later, the
woman summoned help for her daughter. The police arrested her for child abuse as soon as
they arrived.).
83. See Davidson, supra note 67, at 361 (contending that CPS tends to hold only mothers
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assign legal liability to her for her husband's abuse of the child." She
may have attempted to seek help from the police or CPS in the past
and have been turned away due to a systemic inability to effectively
confront domestic violence." Finally, a woman may do everything
she can to actively protect her children, but ultimately fail because of
her abuser's determination to harm her and the children if they
attempt to leave him.6
In these situations, the child's best interests would be better served
by removing the abuser from the family than by removing the child
from the home.87 Witnessing one parent abuse another parent can
severely damage a child emotionally and psychologically." If the
abusing parent acted violently toward the child as well, the child will
accountable for child abuse, and should shift their focus to family violence rather than child
violence and mother-blaming); Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 251 ("The
poor treatment of battered women, coupled with the risk of losing their children once they
report incidents of domestic violence, deters women from reporting abuse and seeking
protection for themselves and their children.").
84. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 745 (discussing the legal liability sometimes incurred for
failure to protect).
85. Enos explains that:
CPS deters battered women from contacting its officers because it often offers no
assistance. Moreover, even when agencies do respond, their solutions likely entail
removing the children from both parents rather than protecting the child's
nonabusive parent from the abuser .... The police, another institution that battered
women are expected to look to for assistance, also frequently deter women from
reporting spousal and child abuse.
Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 250. SeeJennifer Parker, Consider Prevailing
Circumstances in Chavez Case, WIs. STATE J., Apr. 17, 1998, at 13A (asserting that women
legitimately fear leaving their abuser because they are 75% more likely to be killed by their
abuser if they leave him).
86. See Brody, supra note 81, at 3 (explaining that an abuser who is served with a protection
order will often increase stalking, harassing, and violent behavior until he forces the woman to
return to him); Davidson, supra note 67, at 363 (conveying that CPS caseworkers often adjudge
a woman irresponsible for staying with her and the children's abuser, but fail to recognize that
abusers often threaten to kill a woman or the children if they leave); see also Enos, Prosecuting
Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 242-43 (analyzing a case in which an abused woman sought aid
from CPS and the police, attempted to obtain a Civil Protection Order, and begged her abuser
to stay away from her and her children. The abuser repeatedly entered her apartment by
smashing her windows, and finally locked the woman and her daughter in a bedroom and
raped her daughter. The woman was convicted of aiding and abetting the rape.).
87. SeeAnnette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in
The Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 588 (1997) (noting that states use "laws passed to
protect women and children from their abusers to separate nonabusive mothers from their
children, rather than abusers from mothers and children."). But see Im Jung Kwuon, Facing
Down Abusers, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1998, at 18 (discussing successful treatment for men who
commit domestic violence).
88. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 89 (discussing the negative repercussions of
witnessing domestic violence); Momjian, supra note 69, at 854 (noting that domestic violence
between parents can harm a child in three ways. First, abusers may also abuse their children.
Second, abused parents may abuse their children. Finally, the children are victimized merely by
witnessing the violence. Moreover, children raised in abusive homes stand a higher risk of
becoming violent as adults.).
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need emotional support and stability by the time CPS is alerted to the
problem.89 In this situation, it may not be in the child's best interest
to remove him from the nonabusive parent. While society judges
women harshly based on paradigms of what it considers a "good
mother," the child may not share this attitude.9' If the legal system
removes the child from the custody of his nonabusive parent, the
legal system becomes complicit with societal condemnation of the
mother. The false assumption of the mother's parenting
incompetency and a somewhat arbitrary value system sends the
message to the child that her mother is "bad."92 Where the child
previously had one parent who failed her, the legal system creates
two. The child may want to be with her mother and feel emotionally
and physically secure in her presence, but the legal system chooses to
displace her from the limited stability in her life and situate her in
foster care.9 In addition to being separated from her mother, a child
often is uprooted from her neighborhood, her school and the ethnic
89. See Claudio DeBellis, Gregory YK" Child Standing in Parental Termination Proceedings and the
Implications of the Foster Parent-Foster Child Relationship on the Best Interests Standard, 8 ST. JOHN'sJ.
LEGAL COMMENT. 501, 519 (1993) (asserting that children need stable homes, and the violence
or neglect that bring CPS into a home destroys that stability).
90. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 79 (asserting that removing a child from his parents
causes emotional harm and should not be done as frequently as it is done today); D'Arcy Fallon
& Todd Hartman, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do/Social Workers Try To Keep Families Together, COLO.
SPRINGS GAzEtTE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al (reporting that experts conclude that
removing a child from his home and placing him in foster care stresses the child considerably
and may not always be in the child's best interests).
91. See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights,
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y, Fall 1995, 61, 61-66 (1995) (explaining that cultural and historical
myths of proper behavior of women and mothers inform our legal judgment of women as
mothers. Our culture demands that mothers be unequivocally self-sacrificing for their children.
The woman who places any of her own needs or desires above her child is a "bad mother.").
92. See Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems,
Custody Outcomes, and Liabiliy for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH. RouNDTABLE 13, 15-16 (1995)
("We tend to see mothers as either saintly good mothers, like the Madonna, who have no
interests apart from perfect service to their children, or as demonic bad mothers who at best are
wholly indifferent to their children and at worst delight in hurting their children."); see also
Neal, supra note 91, at 67. Neal explains:
In cases of terminating parental rights... the judges do not feel compelled to define
the nexus between the behaviors or status of the mother and the harm to the child.
Because they assume that their readers have internalized the same mythology, they
often give information that appeals to the reader on a non-rational level: once you
know this one piece of information about the mother... it is clear what the result of
this case should be.
Id. at 67.
93. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 79 (arguing that those within the abuse and neglect
system often fail to see the "violence perpetrated by the legal process upon a child when he or
she is abruptly and forcibly wrenched away from parents who, however inadequate, are
nonetheless familiar."); Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 231 (asserting that
agencies further traumatize children in abusive families by removing them from their non-
abusive parent); Fallon & Hartman, supra note 90, at Al (noting that one judge considers
removing a child from her home to be a form of child abuse).
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group with which she identifies.9 When viewed in this context,
keeping a child in her daily routine and united with her nonabusive
parent (in cases where she will not be in immediate danger in her
care) appears more desirable than separating her from these
stabilizing forces.9 5 The child has already been victimized by her
father's abuse of both her and her mother." The legal system does
not have to re-victimize her by removing her from her non-abusive
family and familiar environment.
This is not to imply that women who are victims of domestic
violence are not responsible for their children's well-being and care.
If a woman fails to leave her abuser after being offered help in doing
so, a court may terminate her parental rights because her children
are simply not safe in the family environment.97 The legal system does
not have to assign blame to her by saying she willfully exposed her
children to abuse, or blithely turned her head as her partner abused
her children, but the courts can still terminate parental rights if a
woman cannot protect her children while in the presence of the
abuser."
Nonetheless, before a judge decides to terminate parental rights,
she must determine whether the result of that action creates the best
possible future for the child?9 To decide the best interests of the
child, a judge must thoroughly understand the parents' behavior as
94. See Appell, supra note 87, at 599 (listing what a child leaves behind when entering
foster care, such as his kinship network and local community); cf. Mary Beth Murphy, Clevelandi
A Pioneer in Neighborhood Foster Care-Expeiences Offer Lessons for Officials Here, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, June 7, 1998, at 1 (discussing a recently implemented local program designed to
keep children in a familiar locality when they enter foster care. Generally, Child Protective
Services do not attempt to keep children in their neighborhood when they enter foster care.
However, a new program recognizes that children are "already traumatized by being taken from
their parents [and] fare much better in foster care if they can stay close to family, friends,
classmates, and familiar surroundings.").
95. See Neal, supra note 91, at 67 (noting that analysts of child abuse and neglect maintain
that children are "more often than not better off if they are able to retain familial ties with their
parents").
96. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing how spousal and child abuse
affect children).
97. See State v. J.RtC., 455 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Neb. 1990) (terminating a mother's parental
rights because "despite efforts by the court, the mother is unable to terminate the abusive
relationship she has with her husband and is therefore unable to provide a healthy, loving, and
safe environment for her child"); Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
in Parental Rights Termination Cases, 32 U. LA.J. FAM. L. 785, 789 (1994) (enumerating situations
in which courts may terminate parental rights, including when "extreme or repeated abuse has
occurred ... or when the conditions necessitating removal of the child have not been remedied
and no reasonable likelihood exists that they will be").
98. SeeJ.RC. & N.J.C., 455 N.W.2d at 807 (including a parent's inability to care for and
protect a child as a reason to terminate parental rights).
99. See Neal, supra note 91, at 66-67 (explaining reasons why states terminate parental
rights and discussing the procedural process of termination).
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viewed in the context of how it affects the child."° By separating
domestic violence issues from abuse and neglect law, most
jurisdictions do not currently mandate that judges make such a
determination."' Acknowledging the presence of domestic violence
in the home creates a context in which a judge can analyze parents'
actions, or, in the case of many domestic violence victims, apparent
inactions, and truly make decisions based on the best interests of the
child.
0 2
V. ASFA's FAILURE TO ADDRESS DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE
A. Domestic Violence and "Aiding and Abetting" Under ASFA
ASFA section 103 requires a state to initiate or join termination of
parental rights proceedings if a parent has "aided or abetted [in
the] ... murder or voluntary manslaughter"' 3 of a previous child.'
4
Generally, in determining whether a defendant has aided or abetted
a crime, a court considers whether the defendant encouraged or
helped another person "in planning or committing" the offense.0 5 In
situations where a parent is charged with aiding and abetting murder
or manslaughter of her child, however, the state's approach is
somewhat different. All fifty states assign parents a legal duty to
protect their children."' This enables states to prosecute a parent for
murder or manslaughter when the parent did not affirmatively
100. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1060 (1991) (asserting that courts should assess
parents' behavior as it relates to their child); Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians ad Litem as Surrogate
Parents: Implicationsfor Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1799 (1996)
("The determination of the best interests of another person requires... a thorough
understanding of the physical and psychological inter-relationship of the child and his
parents....").
101. See Babb, supra note 23, at 46-49 (noting that the fragmentation of family courts results
in holdings based on incomplete information that do not serve litigants well).
102. See Davidson, supra note 67, at 359-60 (remarking that states generally have different
legal systems for addressing domestic abuse and child abuse, and combining the two in one
legal system is essential); cf Amy Haddix, Comment, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of
Domestic Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757,
799-800 (1996) (advocating termination of batterers' parental rights).
103. ASFA § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
104. Id.
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1997).
106. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 236 (relating that 37 states have
"omission statutes," which are used to punish women for failing to protect their children). All
50 states designate to parents an affirmative duty to protect their children. Id.
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participate in the' killing in any way, but did not actively attempt to
stop it."'
Domestic violence victims have been held criminally liable for
murder or manslaughter when their abusive partners killed their
child."" Labastida v. State"° illustrates the sometimes unjust results the
aiding and abetting doctrine has on an abused parent's liability. In
Labastida, a Nevada trial court convicted Kriseya Labastida of second-
degree murder and child neglect when her boyfriend, Michael
Strawser, killed the couple's seven-week-old son, Thunder."0
Labastida was twenty-four years old when Thunder, her first child,
died."' Thunder's father abused the baby repeatedly during the
child's brief life, but said he "concealed his actions from Labastida by
abusing the baby behind closed doors or while she was asleep."".
Labastida noticed the baby's injuries, but her boyfriend lied about
their origins and convinced her not to seek medical attention, saying
the baby's bruises were improving and that their prayers would heal
him."5 Still, Labastida took the baby to a doctor twice because she
noticed that Thunder cried incessantly."' On the morning of
Thunder's death, Labastida observed Thunder having difficulty
breathing and wanted to take him to the hospital, but Strawser
"persuaded her that the child was getting better."". That afternoon,
107. SeeJohnson v. State, 501 S.E.2d 815, 817 (Ga. 1998) (finding a mother guilty for felony
murder and cruelty to children, where the mother never abused her child but did not interfere
with her boyfriend's abuse of the child); People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (I11. 992)
(discussing two cases where mothers were held responsible for their partners' killing of their
children); State v. Maupin, 859 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tenn. 1993) (reaching a guilty finding of first
or second-degree murder for a mother who left her son in the care of her boyfriend, who then
killed him); cf Jacobs, supra note 20, at 637 (asserting that battered women often actively
attempt to protect their children from abuse, but that courts view their behaviors as insufficient
"non-action." Mothers' protective behaviors have included planning their child's daily routine
to decrease the amount of time a child spends with the abusive parent, interfering verbally or
physically, or leaving the home.).
108. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REv. 95, 116 (1993)
(discussing situations in which the law holds a mother legally responsible for her partner's
actions toward their children).
109. 931 P.2d 1334 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237 (1997).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1336.
113. See id. (recounting that Strawser told Labastida the baby had fallen off the bed and off
the washing machine).
114. See Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237
(1997) (noting that Labastida took Thunder to a pediatrician when he was two days old, and to
a breast-feeding specialist at two weeks old, thinking the child was crying because he had colic).
115. Id.
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Thunder stopped breathing.Y6 Labastida called 911 and Thunder
was rushed to the hospital, where he died.
117
The lower court sentenced Labastida to life in prison for second
degree murder and a consecutive twenty year term for child
neglect." The appellate court affirmed Labastida's sentence."9 In a
footnote, the appellate court discounted the possibility that Strawser
abused and intimidated Labastida, reasoning that he would not have
hidden his child abuse from Labastida if he abused her as well. 2 The
dissent criticized the majority's holding, stating, "[t]his is a typical
case in which a woman has been trapped by fear by an abusive and
dominating male figure. Her failure or inability to remove herself
and her baby from Strawser's household is indeed pitiable, but it is
not murder.
" 12
'
The Labastida court's holding is troubling for three reasons. First,
as the concurrence and dissent asserted, no evidence existed showing
that Labastida abused her child or condoned Strawser's abuse.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to convict Labastida of a crime
that she did not physically commit,23 Second, the majority casually
dismissed the possibility that Strawser abused or intimidated
Labastida.'24 The court did not engage in any legal analysis, cite any
precedent, or refer to any authority to support its assertion that
Strawser would not have hidden his abuse of the child from Labastida
if he was abusing her as well.'25 Rather, the court conjectured that a
116. Id. at 1335.
117. Id. at 1336.
118. Id. at 1339.
119. Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237
(1997).
120. See id. at 1335 n.1 (asserting that Labastida could not have remained unaware of the
brutalization to which her child was subjected).
121. Id. at 1349 n.7 (Springerj., dissenting).
122. See id. at 1342 (Shearing, J., concurring) ("There is not one iota of evidence that
Labastida inflicted one injury on the child .... There is substantial evidence that Labastida was
concerned about the welfare of her child and took measures to see to his welfare."); id. at 1343
(Springer, J., dissenting) (stating that Labastida did not abuse her child or endorse Strawser's
abuse).
123. See id. at 1343 (Springer, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear from the record that she did not
murder her son .... This is the most tragic miscarriage of justice that I have had the
misfortune to witness in my close-to-sixteen years on this court.").
124. Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1335 n.1 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237
(1997) (addressing why the court did not believe domestic violence was an issue in the case).
125. Id. The court relegated the issue of Labastida's possible abuse and intimidation to a
brief footnote. Labastida, 931 P.2d at 1335 n.1. The court rejected the possibility that Strawser
intimidated Labastida, asserting "it is difficult to believe" he would have hidden his abuse from
her if she were intimidated by him. Id. The court based its conclusion on its own inability to
conceive of a reason for Strawser's hiding the abuse and without citing any authority to confirm
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batterer would not hide his child abuse from his partner, and
assumed that no further explanation was needed for a reasonable
jury to find Labastida guilty of aiding and abetting in the murder of
her son.2 6 Third, the decision is problematic in light of ASFA's
possible repercussions for a woman in Labastida's position who has
more than one child.
127
Under ASFA, a state would be compelled to initiate TPR
proceedings against Labastida with respect to any other children she
had who were in the abuse and neglect system. 2 8  The state would
likely place her other children in the abuse and neglect system,
because the death of one child can be the impetus for the state to
restrict parental rights." ASFA section 103 compels a state to join or
initiate TPR proceedings immediately upon a child's entry into the
foster care system.m This requirement allows no time for a state
investigation of the abused parent's actual behavior in aiding and
its assumption of how an abuser behaves. Id. Because the court did not question why Strawser
hid his abuse of the child from Labastida, the court concluded that Labastida willfully ignored
the abuse of her child. Id. This explanation contradicts evidence the court mentioned
throughout its opinion. Strawser admitted at one point that he hid his abuse from Labastida
and lied to her about the baby's injuries. Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Nev. 1996),
cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237 (1997). On several occasions, including the day of Thunder's
death, Strawser told Labastida not to seek medical assistance. Id. at 1336. On one occasion,
Labastida's landlady attempted to convince the young mother to take Thunder to the hospital.
Id. Labastida declined, but stared "intensely and very fiercely" at Strawser. Id. at 1338.
Although this evidence does not conclusively prove that Strawser intimidated Labastida, it
indicates that Labastida was acting against her will in not seeking medical attention, not that she
purposefully failed to aid her child. Id. The evidence warrants further inquiry and discussion
than the footnote the court dedicated to it.
126. See Labastida, 931 P.2d at 1335 n.1 (expressing that Strawser would not have hidden the
child abuse from Labastida if he also abused her); see also Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered
Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers? 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 191 (1995) (explaining that
batterers do not fit an easily definable personality type or generally behave in ways that overtly
reveal them as abusive people); Neal, supra note 91, at 67 (explaining thatjudges sometimes use
language and information in their rulings that appeal to readers on a "pre-rational" level,
drawing on our assumptions of how individuals should or will behave). See generally Alene
Kristal, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: The Battered Women's Syndrome Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTs. 111, 116 (1991) (examining the profile of a typical batterer); Minow, supra note 78,
at 1665 (discussing how judges can use language to draw on our assumptions of what specific
words imply to explain their rulings).
127. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing ASFA's potential
repercussions on battered women).
128. See ASFA § 103 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (requiring courts to
immediately initiate TPR proceedings for children who enter the abuse and neglect system
where a parent has been convicted of murdering one of her children).
129. See In -m William D., 198 A.D.2d 40, 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (explaining that a
mother's children were removed from her home because she had "derivatively abused" them
when she killed another one of her children); People v. Ray, 411 N.E.2d 88, 88 (I1. App. Ct.
1980) (stating that after a mother was convicted of murdering one of her children, her parental
rights regarding her other children were correctly terminated).
130. ASFA§ 103.
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abetting in the murder of her child."' In a case such as Labastida's,
this approach may not be in the best interests of the woman's other
children because there was no evidence presented that Labastida
knowingly hurt her child.32 Furthermore, the majority, concurrence,
and dissent all note that Labastida's failure to seek medical attention
for the baby was strongly influenced by Strawser;33 both the majority
and dissent address the potential existence of domestic violence. M
The facts indicate that while a woman in Labastida's position may be
an inappropriate parent when under the influence and control of her
abusive partner, she is not necessarily an inherently dangerous
individual who should not have custody of her child. 35 However,
ASFA section 103 fails to consider this type of situation, and mandates
that a state immediately begin TPR proceedings against a loving, well-
intentioned woman whose insubordination under a dictatorial and
violent male figure precludes her from taking action on behalf of her
child.'36 Rather than requiring that states consider spousal violence
when investigating child abuse, ASFA encourages states to follow the
exact opposite course by mandating that states blame an abused
woman for acts she did not commit, and work from a presumption of
parental unfitness based on these acts.3 7
B. Domestic Violence and "Felony Assault" Under ASFA
ASFA section 103(a) also requires a state to initiate or join
immediate TPR proceedings if the parent has "committed a felony
assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to
131. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2739 (stating
that in some circumstances, a state will not make reasonable efforts to reunite the family).
132. See Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1343 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1237
(1997) (Shearing, J., concurring) (arguing that Labastida did not knowingly hurt her child
because she trusted the father of her baby).
133. See id. at 1336 ("Strawser also advised Labastida against obtaining medical
assistance .... "); id. at 1342 (Shearing, J, concurring) ( "[W]hen she wanted to seek medical
assistance, Strawser discouraged her...."); id. at 1343 (Springer, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Strawser lied to Labastida extensively regarding the baby's injuries).
134. See id. at 1335 n.1 (noting potential domestic violence and dismissing it); Labastida v.
State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1349 n.7 (Nev. 1996), cert. dismissed 520 U.S. 1237 (1997) (Springer, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Labastida's behavior was affected by Strawser's abuse).
135. See Becker, supra note 92, at 32 ("[T]he mother's successful escape from an abusive
relationship was the most effective way to lower levels of violence against the children.").
136. ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); see supra note 18 (discussing cases in which battered mothers did not intervene
during their partner's abuse of their children, either because they were physically unable to do
so or because they feared that doing so would endanger their own lives).
137. See Bailie, supra note 25, at 2294 (explaining that often times, child welfare agencies
confuse poverty with neglect, charging parents with neglect when the true source of the family's
problems is poverty).
542 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 8:2
another child of the parent"' 38 While the language of section 103(a)
does not specifically include aiding and abetting,'" courts have used
the "failure to protect" doctrine to treat felonies against children
similarly to aiding and abetting murder or manslaughter.4
Using the "failure to protect" doctrine, states successfully prosecute
abused mothers who do not stop their abuser's felony assault of their
child. For example, in State v. Walden,4' a North Carolina court
convicted a woman of assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced
her to five to ten years in prison for felony assault on her child.'
The appellate court upheld this sentence even though the woman
never touched the child herself; the father alone beat the child with a
belt.' The woman testified that she tried to stop the child's father,
but he struck her in the face.144 The court reasoned that the mother
failed to take affirmative steps to protect her child where common
law assigned her this duty.45  Nowhere in the opinion did the court
consider the history of violence toward the mother in that situation.'46
Thus, the court convicted the mother of abusive acts that she did not
commit and may not have been able to stop. 47 Under ASFA section
103, a court would initiate immediate TPR proceedings against this
138. ASFA§ 103(a).
139. See ia
140. See Linda J. Palko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect
Their Children From Their Male Partner Abuse, 6 HAsTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 67, 78 (1995) (noting
that some courts hold women criminally liable for child abuse where they did not interfere with
their partner's abuse even though they never affirmatively abused their children). But see State
v. Rundle, 500 N.W.2d 916, 917-18 (Wis. 1993) (holding that a father could not be convicted of
child abuse where he did not interfere with his wife's abuse of the children, but did not actually
abuse his children himself). See generally Nancy A. Tanck, Commendable or Condemnable? Ciminal
Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children From Abuse, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 659 (1987)
(discussing criminal liability for failure to protect).
141. 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982).
142. Id. at 782.
143. See id. at 783 (holding that the woman was guilty as a principal to the offense when her
child's father beat her child, despite the fact that she tried to stop him and he struck her in the
face, leaving her with visible injuries).
144. Id.
145. See id, at 780 (noting that a non-abusive mother may be convicted on an aiding and
abetting theory solely on the basis that she was present and failed to take reasonable measures
to prevent the assault).
146. See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 780-88 (N.C. 1982) (discussing the defendant's
liability where she committed no affirmative act).
147. Interestingly, the Walden court noted that the "failure to protect" doctrine has limits.
The court explained that parents have no "legal duty to place themselves in danger of death or
great bodily harm in coming to the aid of their children." Id. at 786. Apparently, the court did
not consider the domestic violence inflicted on the mother as sufficient bodily harm to warrant
her failure to stop the child abuse. Id. The court's conclusion seems to reflect a
misunderstanding of--or lack of compassion for-domestic violence victims more than a
careful weighing of the facts.
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woman, punishing her for the acts of another whose physical threats
and intimidation she could not stop.
48
As with situations where a mother does not stop her abuser from
killing her child, ASFA's felony assault provision allows a court to
terminate an abused mother's parental rights.4 9 States apply ASFA's
felony assault provision to situations such as the one in Walden, where
an abused mother never assaulted her child, but could not effectively
stop her abuser from doing so.5' ° Following the enactment of ASFA,
the nonabusive mother is not only criminally liable for her partner's
abuse of her children, but also risks immediate termination of her
parental rights.''
Prior to ASFA's enactment, courts terminated women's parental
rights based on their partner's felony abuse of their children.'52 In In
re B.R, 3 the court terminated a mother's parental rights because her
husband abused one of their children.14 The state filed a petition to
terminate parental rights as to all three children based on the severe
abuse of one child.' During the investigation into the parents'
behavior, the wife revealed that her husband had abused her over the
past two years."6 In one instance, he punched her in the face twice
and hit the baby she was holding. 57  The wife was seven months
pregnant at the time.5 On another occasion, he pushed her head
into a window5 9 and shoved her into a stove. 69 Although the court
noted this evidence, it blamed the woman for not leaving her abuser
148. See ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
149. See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (providing an example of ASFA's
application in this regard).
150. Id. See generally supra notes 142-49 (discussing the mother's role, or lack of a role, in
the child abuse in Walden).
151. See ASFA § 103; see also Cressler, supra note 97, at 795 ("The loss of one's children
through a termination proceeding has been called 'a sanction more severe than
imprisonment.'").
152. See In reJulie E., 451 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (terminating a mother's
parental rights for "allowing" her husband to abuse the children and "not [standing] up" to
him); In re L...E., G..J... 839 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Mo. Ct App. 1992) (terminating a
woman's parental rights for her partner's child abuse).
153. 669 N.E.2d 347 (ill. App. Ct 1996).
154. Id. at 347-48.
155. Id. at 349.
156. Id. at 350.
157. Id.
158. In reB.R., 669 N.E.2d 347, 350 (111. App. Ct 1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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and for exposing her children to "an environment injurious to their
welfare," 6' and terminated her parental rights.'
The court also cited the emotional problems the mother
experienced after her children entered foster care as a reason to
terminate her parental rights.' Considering the woman's emotional
instability, the court probably reached the correct conclusion in
terminating the mother's parental rights.'t  A psychological
evaluation reported that her ability to manage her life was
questionable and that she had poor judgment regarding her own
well-being. If this evaluation was accurate, the woman most likely
could not care for her children effectively, and they would be safer in
foster care or an adoptive home.t
The court's process in reaching this conclusion highlights a
fundamental misunderstanding of domestic violence particularly in
light of ASFA's mandatory termination of parental rights
requirement. 167 The court failed to credit the woman with leaving her
abuser, which she did four months after her children entered foster
care1ta Instead, the court blamed her for staying with her abuser
after she had warning that he had injured her children, and used this
as a reason to terminate her parental rights.' Despite ample
161. Id. at 351.
162. Id.
163. See In re B.R., 669 N.E.2d 347, 350-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (explaining that a
psychological evaluation reported that the mother had had suicidal thoughts and displayed
"poor judgment with regard to decisions affecting her own well-being." The woman credited
her depression to the possibility of losing her children.).
164. See In reA.J., 646 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (basing TPR on the mother's
inability to manage her mental illness); In reJAS., 627 N.E.2d 770, 772 (IlM. App. Ct. 1994)
(terminating a woman's parental rights when she was mentally unstable and could not fulfill
her parental obligations effectively); Schumm v. Schumm, 510 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (terminating a mother's parental rights because of unmanaged bipolar disorder).
165. See In re B.R., 669 N.E.2d 347, 350-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (detailing a report that
concludes the mother is not able to adequately provide for her well-being due to psychological
deficiencies).
166. SeeMarsha Garrison, Child Wefare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternatve,
75 GEO. UJ. 1745, 1798-99 (discussing how to determine whether a child should be considered
neglected if his parent is mentally ill and incapable of providing care).
167. ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to either initiate or join proceedings to terminate parental rights
when a court has determined that a child has either been abandoned or the parent has
committed a specified felony).
168. See In re B.R., 669 N.E.2d at 350-51 (reciting that the woman told a social services
worker that she was no longer in contact with her abuser).
169. See id. at 351 (reasoning that the woman had more forewarning of her boyfriend's
violence toward her children than she had claimed). The court cited as evidence an incident in
which the boyfriend punched her twice in the face and hit the baby she was holding. See id.
(recounting an incident of abuse upon the mother). The court referenced the woman's
injuries suffered in this incident, only to show that she willfully chose to put herself and her
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evidence of domestic violence toward the mother, the court did not
consider that she may have stayed with her children and their abuser
out of fear of leaving, or an inability to do so.17° Further, the court
gave no credence to the possibility that losing her children caused
her emotional distress.Y Instead, the court viewed her emotional
instability and her husband's abuse of her as evidence to support the
conclusion that she willfully placed her children in danger and might
do so again if the court returned her children to her.Y17 This court
only recognized the existence of domestic violence in the context of
blaming the mother and using it as evidence of her parental
unfitness.' 7s
ASFA section 103's mandatory termination of parental fights for
felony assault discourages courts from approaching the situation of a
domestic violence victim differently than did the court in In re B.RY*
The statutory language mandates that states begin TPR proceedings
immediately if a woman has been convicted of felony abuse.'7
Therefore, a state must initiate TPR proceedings against a battered
woman unless the state can articulate a compelling reason why
initiating such proceedings does not serve the child's best interests.76
However, this is unlikely due to both the preexisting stigma against
children in a position where they were harmed. See id. (taking into consideration the abuse
suffered by the mother only in relation to the harmful environment that the mother and her
child lived due to the mother's inaction).
170. See In re B.R., 669 N.E.2d 347, 349-51 (IMI. App. Ct. 1996) (noting instances where the
man abused his wife and claiming that her failure to leave supports the court's decision to
terminate her parental rights without noting a possible correlation between his abuse and
intimidation with her failure to leave him sooner).
171. See id. at 350-51 (recognizing that the woman daimed her depression was caused by the
possibility of losing her children, but citing her depression to support the termination of her
parental rights).
172. The court reasoned:
[T]he record reflects that Brown had more forewarning about Forest's violent
tendencies toward herself and her children than she claims .... She stayed with
Forest even after she told Detective Allen that she thought he had caused B.L's
injuries. During this time, she had suicidal thoughts .... In sum, the trial court's
decision to terminate Brown's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
Id. at 350-51.
173. See id at 349-51 (relying in part on her partner's abuse of her to find the mother an
unfit parent).
174. See ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (addressing situations in which courts must begin immediate TPR
proceedings, and excluding any mention of situations in which courts may choose to forgo
immediate TPR proceedings, such as in cases of domestic violence).
175. See supra note 41 (quoting text of ASFA § 103).
176. See supra note 41 (quoting text of ASFA § 103); infra section V.C (discussing the
meaning of "compelling reason" under ASFA).
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battered women and the Act's discouragement that courts view
violence victims sympathetically.'
In some cases, terminating an abused woman's parental rights may
be the only way to ensure her children's safety.'78 However, in some
cases termination may not be appropriate.79 It seems unlikely that
ASFA will always achieve the best interests of the child when much
existing case law does not sufficiently consider domestic violence
against a parent during TPR proceedings, and ASFA does nothing to
change this.'0 Even though it purports to focus on the child's best
interests, ASFA may result in the unjust separation of children from
their non-abusive mothers. 81
C. The Meaning of "Compelling Interest" in ASFA Section 103
Under ASFA section 103, if the state does not believe termination
of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, it must provide a
"compelling reason" to delay the onset of TPR proceedings.'82 ASFA
177. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing misperceptions of battered
women's behaviors and a systemic tendency of the courts to view battered women without
sympathy).
178. See Becker, supra note 92, at 21 ("No matter how weak the mother, she is in a much
better position than the child to prevent abuse and owes a duty of care to her children.").
179. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 745-56 (recounting situations in which women could not
interfere with their partner's abuse of the children). In one situation, a woman did not
interfere because when she did so previously, her abuser beat her and her children more
severely. Id. at 747. After the beating, she took her children to her mother's house, and sought
medical attention for them. Id. at 747-48. The hospital immediately turned the children over
to the Department of Social Services. See id. at 748 (stating that the children were taken away
from the mother even though she sought treatment for the abuse of her children). In this
situation, the mother did not fail her children; rather, she acted to protect them as soon as she
could, knowing that more immediate action would trigger more abuse and not be in the best
interests of her child. Id. Initiating immediate TPR proceedings against her, as ASFA would
require the state to do, does not serve the best interests of the child, because their mother is not
a danger to them. Id. Another woman failed to seek immediate medical attention for her
daughter because her abuser held a knife to her throat and bolted the door. See id. at 755
(detailing an incident in which a mother was unable to get medical attention for her abused
child due to abuse inflicted upon her). As soon as the abuser left the apartment, the woman
called the police, who arrested her for child abuse upon arrival. Id. In this situation,
terminating the woman's parental rights in accordance with ASFA will not only be grossly unjust
to the mother, but will not even further the Act's goal of protecting the child and moving her
into a permanent, stable home; absent the father, this mother's home is permanent and stable.
See also In re C.D.C., 455 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Neb. 1990) (upholding a lower court's decision to
terminate the parental rights of a mother who suffered severe abuse and was unable to sever the
relationship with the abuser).
180. See supra Part III (discussing the separation of abuse and neglect law and domestic
violence, which results in courts Mailing to consider domestic violence in abuse and neglect
proceedings).
181. See supra notes 10.-77 and accompanying text (addressing how ASFA transfers existing
injustices in criminal law into abuse and neglect law).
182. ASFA § 103(a) provides:
The State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents
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does not define "compelling reason" or give examples of a
compelling reason. During debate on ASFA, several speakers
stressed that ASFA addresses situations where states must pursue TPR
immediately, but no one spoke at length about the inclusion of a
"compelling reasons" standard for a state to forgo TPR
proceedings.14 This indicates that legislators did not consider the
"compelling reason" exception a pivotal part of the Act. Although it
provides the only possible way for a section 103 parentss to avoid
immediate TPR proceedings, the statutory language and the states'
interpretation of "compelling reason" may not effectively protect the
parent's interests.
86
Upon initial review, the "compelling reason" exception appears to
protect the parent's interests in her child.87 However, the language
represents a semantic shift that may actually decrease a section 103
parent's rights18s In the past, courts required compelling reasons to
terminate parental rights.89 This requirement assured that states
(or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to
the petition), and concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified
family for an adoption, unless... a State agency has documented in the case plan
(which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that
filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child ....
ASFA § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
183. Id.; see also Hough, supra note 43, at 469 ("Presently, there is no guidance regarding
what would be a 'compelling reason' for the state to opt not to file a petition to terminate
parental rights.").
184. See 143 CONG. REC. H2012-06, H2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Shaw) (noting that ASFA is comprised of three major sections, one of which is "aggravated
circumstances" where states must not make reunification efforts, but not explaining this
further); 143 CONG. Rtc. H2012-06, H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Kennelly) (listing situations where a state must initiate TPR, but not offering any compelling
reasons why a state would not do so).
185. I use the term "section 103 parent" to refer to any parent whose children have been in
the state's abuse and neglect system for 15 of the last 22 months, or, who, at the time her
children enter foster care, has committed the murder or voluntary manslaughter of one of her
children, or felony assault on one of her children. This categorization encompasses those
individuals that ASFA section 103 includes. See ASFA § 103 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (listing the cases for the initiation of
proceedings to terminate parental rights).
186. See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (discussing the failures of the
compelling reason exception).
187. ASFA § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). Compared to the other option of mandatory and immediate TPR proceedings,
this narrow exception appears to contemplate and potentially protect a parent's interest in
raising her child. Id
188. See infra notes 189-91 (discussing how the semantic shift affects section 103 parents'
rights).
189. See Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J.,
concurring) ("The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, in its 'substantive' aspect, protects fundamental liberties from state interference
absent a compelling reason for the state's action."); Black v. Gray, 540 A.2d 431,435 (Del. 1988)
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considered the repercussions of severing a child's biological ties with
her parents before terminating parental rights.9" ASFA uses the same
language to subvert the logic behind this requirement, directing that
states provide a compelling reason to not initiate TPR proceedings.'
Also, ASFA dictates that the state provide a compelling reason to
forego termination, not the parent.92 If state agencies continue the
insensitivity to domestic violence issues that they have shown in the
past,93 a state worker might not even consider presenting the
woman's abuse as a compelling reason to delay termination of her
parental rights, where she has been convicted of a felony under the
"failure to protect" doctrine.- The statute does not grant the parent
("The termination of a parent's rights is a drastic, final measure to be invoked only for the most
compelling reasons."); In re the Adoption of KS.H., 442 N.W.2d 417, 419-21 (N.D. 1989)(upholding the trial court's ruling that deprivation, with no chance of improvement, did not
provide a compelling reason to terminate parental rights.); In re C.R.D., 897 P.2d 181, 184
(Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting that parental rights are fundamental rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and only to be terminated for
compelling reasons); Worm v. Worm, 573 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Neb. Ct App. 1997) (Sievers, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with majority's decision that the prosecution presented no compelling
reason to terminate a father's parental rights, where the father abandoned his daughter);
Deegan v. Jefferson County, 525 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that a parent's
rights can only by terminated if the child is abused, neglected, or there are other compelling
circumstances).
190. See In re the Adoption of KS.H., 442 N.W.2d at 420 (noting the trial court's logic for not
terminating parental rights. The trial court found that, although the child was deprived by his
father, he was not harmed because his grandparents were his primary caretakers. Therefore,
the deprivation was not "sufficient reason to cut the parental bond."); Cressler, supra note 97, at
796 (contending that children look to their biological family to understand their physical selves
and to develop their self-perception); Rosemary Shaw Sackett, Terminating Parental Rights of the
Handicapped, 25 FAMI. L.Q. 253, 262-63 (1991) (asserting that when a child's biological
relationships are severed, he may suffer "physical deprivations," and that the distinction
between the parent's interests and child's interests may be difficult to discern); see also Mark
Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting Adoption, and the Best
Interest of the Child, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 49, 52-53 (1996) (discussing courts' articulations of the
parent-child bond that develops when a biological parent raises his child).
191. ASFA § 103(a) Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). This semantic shift, combined with the general guiding philosophy behind ASFA
that states focus on the child, may encourage courts to view termination of parental rights less
stringently for section 103 parents. Id. While ASFA addresses the TPR proceedings, not the
termination itself, the semantic shift changes the discourse regarding section 103 parents. Id.
When a section 103 parent finally gets to the termination hearing, the parties might infer a
presumption of parental unfitness for two reasons. Id. First, the statute lays out acts that are
carte blanche reasons to initiate termination, rather than leaving this assessment to the
discretion of the state agency. ASFA § 103(a) (E). Second, if no compelling reason existed to
forgo TPR proceedings when the child entered foster care, a court may view the parental rights
of a section 103 parent less stringently than it views other parents' rights. Id.
192. See id. (outlining the requirements placed upon states in proceedings to terminate
parental rights).
193. See supra Part Il (discussing common misperceptions of battered women held by state
child abuse and neglect workers).
194. See supra Part IllI (addressing state agencies' failure to address domestic violence).
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power to advocate for herself in this situation, and the state seems
unlikely to advocate for her.9"
Furthermore, as states codify ASFA, the meaning of "compelling
reason" remains oblique.'96 States seem to either share the federal
legislators' ambivalence regarding what constitutes a compelling
reason,97 or seem to move toward a definition that focuses on the
child's circumstance, rather than the parent's actual behavior leading
to the criminal conviction.' While consideration of a child's present
living situation may provide a compelling reason to not terminate
parental rights, the child-focus seems to be achieved at the expense
of considering the parent's circumstances.'
It remains unclear whether a woman's abuse by her husband may
provide a compelling reason to not proceed with TPR proceedings.2"
Further, because abuse and neglect agencies are generally ill-
equipped to deal with domestic violence issues, their desire to pursue
the option of reunifying the children and the mother on this ground
remains unlikely."'
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As stated previously, ASFA does not create the legal separation of
domestic abuse from child abuse. 20 2 This problem is systemic within
abuse and neglect law nationwide. 23  However, ASFA's failure to
address domestic abuse within abuse and neglect law may increase
195. See supra Part III (addressing states' sometimes unjust treatment of battered women,
which seems based on systemic misperceptions and assumptions).
196. See Hough, supra note 43, at 466 (explaining that Missouri codified ASFA as Missouri
Revised Statutes § 211.183). There are currently no guidelines in assessing what is a compelling
reason, but "[ildeally, the primary consideration in that determination will be the needs of
children." Id. at 469.
197. See Hough, supra note 43, at 469 (explaining that the statute provides no guidance for
interpreting "compelling reasons").
198. SeeJerry Ann Donaldson, Legislative Update J. KAN. BA., Aug. 1998, at 14, 36 (stating
that Kansas bill H.B. 2820, the state's version of ASFA, allows for compelling reasons to cease
TPR proceedings, such as when "the child is in a stable placement with a relative").
199. See ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (discussing compelling reasons for forgoing TPR proceedings, and failing
to mention any reason connected to the parent's circumstance, such as domestic violence).
200. Id.; see supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (explaining that the legislative history
and states' interpretation of the act do not indicate that domestic violence is a possible
compelling circumstance to forgo TPR).
201. See Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers, supra note 18, at 250-51 (asserting that Child
Protective Services and the police are often unresponsive to battered women's needs).
202. See supra Part III (discussing the systemic separation of domestic violence from abuse
and neglect proceedings).
203. See Babb, supra note 23, at 38-46 (outlining how each jurisdfiction addresses family law,
and concluding that most do not adopt a comprehensive approach).
2000]
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 8:2
the division between the two areas of law, rather than join them to
work in the best interests of the child2 4 Because ASFA does not
create the situation, changing the Act will not fix the problem
entirely.2°5 However, revising ASFA provides an important step in
bringing together domestic violence and abuse and neglect law. °6
ASFA section 103 requires that a state initiate or join immediate
termination of parental rights proceedings where a parent aided or
abetted the killing of a child or committed felony assault against a
child.2 °7 When adopting ASFA, states should include in this section
an explanation of what constitutes aiding and abetting. Legislators
should cite cases that demonstrate how an abused woman could be
convicted for a felony assault she did not cOmmit. 208  They should
caution judges and CPS against blaming an abused woman for acts
she did not commit and could not stop because of a legitimate fear of
greater harm to her child based on threats, physical injury, physical
restraint, or past experience with her abuser.20 The section should
instruct that whenever immediate TPR proceedings take place due to
aiding and abetting murder or manslaughter or because of felony
assault, the state agency will be required to do an investigation into
possible domestic violence in the family and offer a woman aid in
leaving her abuser. This would not be too drastic a move,
considering the overwhelming correlation between child abuse and
domestic violence.210
Further, states should define "compelling reason." This definition
should provide a list of possible compelling reasons to forego
immediate TPR proceedings, including the woman's actions or
inactions explained by the domestic violence dynamic that controls
204. See supra Part V (discussing how ASFA could transfer existing injustices in criminal law
into abuse and neglect proceedings).
205. See supra Parts III & IV (discussing the need for unified family courts and the current
failure of the abuse and neglect system to address domestic violence).
206. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (discussing how state legislatures could
insert language into ASFA that would mandate or encourage courts to consider domestic
violence).
207. ASFA § 103, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
208. See supra Part V.B (discussing felony assault under the aiding and abetting doctrine and
noting cases in which women were unjustly prosecuted under this doctrine).
209. See supra Parts IV & V (explaining that battered women may act in ways that a person
not familiar with battering relationships considers irresponsible, and ASFA encourages those
working in the abuse and neglect system to blame women for behavior without understanding
it).
210. See supra Part III (addressing the statistical correlation between domestic abuse and
child abuse). .,-
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the family.21 A woman's status as a domestic violence victim,
however, should not automatically excuse her inability to protect her
children. 2 However, if she is willing to leave her abuser with the
state's help, and does not herself present a threat to her children, the
state will not serve her children's best interests by severing their
relationship with their mother.1 3
Placing the child in foster care wrenches him from whatever small
amount of stability exists in his life and sends him the message that
both of his parents are inadequate.214 By statutorily instructingjudges
and people who work within the abuse and neglect system to consider
the impact of domestic violence, the risk of unjustly removing a child
from his nonabusive parent decreases, and we will begin to offer just
results to both parents and children.2
VII. CONCLUSION
The distinction between laws that reflect societal mores and
assumptions and those that attempt to dictate them has become
blurred. This Comment suggests that the law should move faster
than social attitudes. If our legal system continues to reflect false
societal assumptions and assigns blame where it should instead
provide aid, there may never be an impetus for change; static
jurisprudence will never truly work toward the best interests of the
child.
Children in the abuse and neglect system cannot advocate for a
change in societal assumptions regarding their abused mothers. 6
Abused mothers who live in fear and danger in their own homes are
unlikely to advocate effectively for themselves. 7 We cannot assume
that judges and others involved in the abuse and neglect system will
211. See supra notes 66-71 (discussing how domestic violence dominates family relationships
and is inextricably linked to child abuse).
212. See Becker, supra note 92, at 21 (asserting that custodial adults should be responsible
for their children, even if they are themselves battered).
213. See Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights
of People Labeled Developihentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1458 (1995)
(asserting that courts often fail to consider the importance children place on their relationships
with their parents).
214. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (addressing the harm children suffer
when they enter foster care, and advocating avoiding that harm where possible).
215. See supra Parts III & IV (discussing current injustices that result from the separation of
domestic violence from abuse and neglect situations, and noting situations in which separating
a child from his nonabusive parent creates an unjust result for both the child and parent).
216. See 143 CONG. REc. H2012-06, H2015 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Shaw) (noting that children in the foster care system are "the most fragile among us").
217. SeeAshe & Cahn, supra note 70, at 112 (noting "the limited ability of 'bad mothers' to
speak for and about themselves").
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incorporate domestic violence considerations into abuse and neglect
law of their own volition.18 We cannot expect those who work within
the abuse and neglect system to assume a sensitive attitude toward
battered women as they follow ASFA if they remain unaware of the
effect that domestic violence has on women's behavior.219
ASFA, although in many ways much needed legislation,220 fails to
incorporate domestic violence law into abuse and neglect
proceedings.nI However, states have the opportunity to expand on
the statutory language as they incorporate the Act into their state
codes. ASFA cannot, nor should it have to, fix all the problems in
our nation's abuse and neglect system, from fragmentation of family
court proceedings, to the sometimes unjust application of criminal
liability for the failure to protect 222 However, as it exists, ASFA may
actually exacerbate some of the systemic problems those working in
abuse and neglect law have been trying to rectify for years.2
State legislatures should insert language into ASFA that draws
attention to some of these problems and encourage states to view
child abuse and neglect in the context of family abuse. Adopting a
comprehensive approach compels states to approach abuse and
neglect cases with a sensitivity to domestic violence and encourages
states to unify family courts, while keeping the child's health and well-
being paramount. In these ways, we may truly begin to work in the
best interests of the child, her parents, and ultimately, to the
American society of which these persons form a part.
218. These institutions are often ignorant of domestic violence symptoms and effects of
domestic violence on women's actions or apparent inactions.
219. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (explaining that ignorance of domestic
violence breeds insensitivity to its victims and their realities).
220. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text (outlining the current state of foster care
in the United States); see also Dana Mack, We Can't Help Kids by Destroying Families: Foster Care
Legislation Would Take Children From Parents Who Are Poor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at B5 ("Child
abuse is a serious and rising problem .... Yet of the 120,000 adoptions in this country each
year, only 20,000 are from foster care."); Gene Warner, County Launches Pilot Program Aiming to
Reduce Children s Time in Foster Care, Expedite Adoptions, BUFFALO NEWS, May 15, 1998, at C5
(quoting one judge asserting, "'[w]e all recognize that children are spending far too long in
foster care without finding a permanent home'" and discussing how ASFA attempts to rectify
this).
221. See supra Parts II & V (discussing ASFA's intense child focus and failure to address all
parents' situations, especially those who are battered women).
222. See supra notes 59-65 and 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing states' diverse
systems of addressing family law matters and battered women's potential criminal liability for
failure to protect their children from their partner's abuse).
223. See Babb, supra note 23, at 36 (reporting that the Standard Court Act suggested
unifying family courts as far back as 1959); Ross, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that the ABA
suggested the unification of family courts in 1980).
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